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Abstract: 
In this paper Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with asymmetric First price auction (FPA) has been 
subject of investigation. Bilateral inefficiency trade theorem versus the efficiency of the FPA auctions 
in which there is supposedly no dominant strategy, where bids are private information, and are made 
simultaneously, where highest bid wins and winning bidder pays the winning bid. This type of auction 
may not be Pareto efficient (this condition requires that the item is allocated to the bidder with 
highest valuation). But in the sealed FPA auctions highest bidder does not know other bidders’ 
valuations and may lose to another bidder. In the auction setting we set reserve price that causes 
efficiency loss and decreases probability of trade. The results are ambiguous dependent on the type of 
the solution method used. Three methods of solution were used: Fixed point finite difference 
iterations, Backward shooting method, and Constrained strategic equilibrium (C.S.E). The reserve 
price set was 0.5 since and , so the buyers’ value is likely to be    and 
the sellers’ value is likely to be ,so in such case reserve price would eliminate low bidder 
types. The results are ambiguous in a sense that under Backward shooting method convergence is not 
true, so the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem does hold which is not case under Fixed finite difference 
point iterations, and Constrained strategic equilibrium (C.S.E).Phenomenon known as winner’s curse 
occurs in a case of incomplete information.  
Key words: FPA, asymmetric auctions, C.S.E, Backward shooting method, Fixed point finite 
difference iterations, winner’s curse  
JEL classification: D44 
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Introduction 
In the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting, people have private information about the utilities for various 
exchanges of goods at different prices. The Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem (MS) is an important 
result in mechanism design theory and asymmetric information and this theorem is due to Myerson, 
Satterthwaite (1983) paper. The main result of the theorem states that there is no efficient way for two 
parties to trade when they have secret and probabilistically varying CDF’s and PDF’s, without the risk 
of one-party trading at loss. Proofs of this theorem are provided in the auction theory graduate 
textbooks such as Khrisna (2009) and Milgrom(2004).This theory relates back to most famous 
adverse selection problem posed as the lemons problem ,as Akerlof (1970).Utility function of the 
seller and the buyer  in that model are: (seller’s utility)  and , 
(buyer’s utility) i.e.sellers’ get one dollar’s worth of utility from one quality-unit of used car, and the 
buyer’s get  3/2 dollars’ worth of utility from one quality-unit of used car, M is the consumption other 
goods than that subject of trade (their price is unitary), is the quality of the ithused car. The 
problem is the average quality provided by the sellers which is not equal to price but the 
average quality is ,since the quality of lemons is . In that model buyers do not 
trade since their expected net gain is negative -1/4*p (they cannot trade with expected loss up to 
quarter of a dollar).Expected value to the buyer is the price he pays times the quality he receives in 
this case ,while the expected trade gain is expected value minus price 
.If however they are naïve and trade their loss will be . As in this 
example the assumptions of M-S theorem are posed: Individual rationality: , weak 
balanced budget (the auctioneer does not subsidize trade). But the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is not 
incentive compatible (trade participants namely seller’s cheat),  and it 
is not ex-post Pareto efficient that the item should be given to then one that vales most but here his 
value is not equal to the expected quality (there are costs of dishonesty).Market produces gains only 
for sellers and loss only for the buyers, so this trade is not efficient. This the basic motivation of this 
paper. A typical feature of auctions is the presence of asymmetric information (see Klemperer (1999), 
Gibbons (1992)), the appropriate concept therefore is Bayesian-
Nashequilibrium1,(seeKajii,A.,Morris,S.(1997), Harsanyi,JohnC.,(1967/1968)).How is this related to 
Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem? A trade with private preferences (known to him) may demand more 
favorable terms than he is in truth willing to accept, and such behavior will lessen the gains from trade 
or will make some to even trade with loss,Rustichini, A.,Satterthwaite, M. A., Williams, S. R., (1994). 
How is this related to the auction theory? Well, founder of the auction theory is William S. Vickrey 
with contributions to the literature he made mostly in the 1960’s and 1970’s, Vickrey 
(1961,1962,1976). Auctions are type of games where players payoff depends on other’s types of 
market participants, e.g. Akerlof (1970), and this market models where participants have information 
that affects other player’s payoffs are called adverse selection models. Although the treatment of 
adverse selection in auction theory has history since 1960’s, yet the largest part of the auction theory, 
1A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is defined as a strategy profile that maximizes the expected payoff for each 
player given their beliefs and given the strategies played by the other players. That is, a strategy profile is a 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if for every player , keeping the strategies of every other player fixed, 
strategy maximizes the expected payoff of player according to his beliefs. Or in general BNE equilibrium is a 
Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game  : ,where ,and 
 also utilities are ,where  denotes finite 
action set.  
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puts adverse selection aside to focus on the private values case, in which every type of participants 
utility depends on its own type. Seminal paper in the literature of asymmetric auctions is written by 
Maskin,Riley (2000),previously bidders were risk neutral and each bidder has a private valuation 
different from the others (different cumulative distribution functions and probability density 
functions), the bidders possess symmetric information, expected payments are functions of their bids, 
McAfee, McMillan,(1987).But in reality this assumptions seem to be very strict namely the 
assumption of :risk-neutrality of the bidders, IPV’s (independence of the private values of the bidders’ 
about the items value),lack of collusion between the buyers, and especially symmetry of the bidders’ 
beliefs are not describing the reality at best. Relaxing of the risk-neutrality assumption was made in 
Riley and Samuelson (1981),show that when bidders are risk-averse than seller favors high-bid 
auction, even if he also exhibits risk aversion.Milgrom, P., Weber,R.J., (1982), relax the assumption 
of IPV independence, by reporting that if the reservation prices are pairwise positively correlated they 
show that English auction(is "open" or fully transparent, as the identity of all bidders is disclosed to 
each other during the auction)exhibits higher revenue than the high-bid auction. And about the third 
assumption, Graham, D., Marshall, R.,(1987),allow for bidders to collide such as in McAfee, 
McMillan,(1992).Graham and Marshal (1987) especially propose that bidders’ collusions are more 
likely to happen in the open type auction where bidders’ know their identities (they can directly 
inspect others behavior).But the symmetric beliefs are rejected in this paper. Which means that 
Revenue equivalence theorem (RET) will not apply here.FPA-First price auction and SPA-Second 
price auction where winners plays second best price will not exert same revenues. On this topic 
(optimal auctions) furthermore Myerson (1981), designed Bayesian-optimal mechanism where it 
makes use of virtual valuations (virtual values are the derivative of the revenue curve). Now back to 
Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem. The remarkable result of Myerson,Satterthwaite (1983)paper is that it 
shows that the distributions don’t matter and that the failure of efficient trade is general property. 
Reny and McAfee (1992) show the nature of the distribution of information matters, and 
McAfee,(1991) showed that continuous quantities can overturn the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem. 
And now put it differently Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem says that if one demands ex-ante budget 
balance, and interim individual rationality than trade cannot be ex-post efficient, Nachbar (2017).Ex-
post efficiency occurs only when buyers value is more than sellers values and opposite is not 
true.Strict Pareto efficienymenas that : .Ex-ante budget balance means 
that while a third party is allowed to provide a net subsidy for some types of profiles ( ,and 
collect net tax for the others’, thethird-party net transfer must be zero over expectations for  -value 
of the buyers and  value for the seller-post budget balance in the other hand requires, zero net 
transfers for all , .Ex-interim individual rationality means that no agent 
losses from participating in the mechanism, and is ex-interim because it holds for every possible 
valuation of agent i.2 
2 More so mechanism is ex-interim individually rational 
if: And a mechanism is ex-post efficient if 
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Theorem 1.1. Revelation principle Myerson,1981 
Suppose that was a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism Γ. Then there exists a direct 
mechanism that is payoff-equivalent and where truthful revelation is an equilibrium. 
Proof:  and these strategies are equivalent in direct and indirect mechanisms. Direct revelation 
mechanism is the one where agent reports his preferences truthfully and hence 
(messages)agents type of profiles are :  and ,the social choice 
function is  where outcome  and in a message space there is mapping . Let’s 
notice that if bidder(player)   with type deviates and reports his other type  that that agent earns 
  for some and we know that (form above said): 
Equation 1 
So this last expression is not profitable . 
Definition Incentive compatibility (Bayesian Incentive compatibility (BIC) ) 
A social choice function  is said to be incentive compatible (IC) or 
truthfully implementable if the Bayesian game (is a game in which the players have incomplete 
information about the other players) induce by the direct revelation mechanism( is one where each 
agent is asked toreport his individual preferences, in which case  and ) or 
has a pure strategy equilibrium(Bayesian-Nash equilibrium) 
where  and  and . 
Individual rationality (IR) axiom 
First we define as in Myerson (1991), two-person bargaining problem , to consist of a pair 
where  is a convex subset of  , is a vector in and the set 
is non-empty and bounded. Where is a set of feasible payoff 
allocations and  represents the disagreement point.F is a convex means that the players are assumed 
that will agree on their jointly randomized strategies so that utility allocations and 
are feasible and so that following expected utility allocation applies 
.Two-players strategic game form is given as:  where 
are used to denote the pure players strategies set. 
Theorem 1.2 Myerson -Satterthwaite 
Theorem Myerson-Satterthwaite: It is not common knowledge that if trade gains exist i.e. the supports 
of the CDF functions (Cumulative distributions) of traders have non-empty intersections) then no 
IC(incentive compatibility) and IR (individual rationality)trading mechanism can be ex-post efficient. 
Proof: A trading mechanism is ex-post efficient if and only if trade occurs whenever 
Equation 2 
In the previous expression  is a probability of trade which takes value 1 if trade occurs and zero 
if it doesn’t. To prove that ex-post efficiency cannot be attained, it is enough to show that inequality 
 in the corollary hence: 
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Equation 3 
Previous expression equals to: 
Equation 4 
Previous result is proof of Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem about trade inefficiency. Some weaker 
efficiency criterion is Pareto optimality, one may use that criterion if ex-post efficiency does not 
work .  
Furthermore one mechanism with transfers  ,  where  is the probability of trade given 
,seller and buyers ex-post utilities are given as: 
Equation 5 
Both traders are risk neutral and there are no income effects. Payoffs are defined as: 
Equation 6 
Probabilities of trade are defined as: 
Equation 7 
Incentive compatible mechanism is defined as: 
Equation 8 
Individually rational mechanism (IR) is given as: 
Equation 9 
Lemma 1 (Mirrlees,Myerson)  
The mechanism is IC compatible if and only if  is increasing and  decreasing, and : 
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Equation 10 
Lemma 1 (proof): From previous we know that 
Equation 11 
If we subtract these inequalities will yield: 
Equation 12 
Now if we take that  implies that  is decreasing, if we divide by  and letting 
yields  and integrating produces IC(s’). The same is true for the buyer. To prove 
the IC for the seller it is suffice to show that following applies: 
Equation 13 
Now from previous by substituting for  and  and by using IC(s’) the following will yield: 
Equation 14 
And following holds , we show that   : 
Equation 15 
Where in the last expression  is unknown parameter i.e. players type. And previous expression holds 
only because  is decreasing.  
Lemma Individual rationality (IR): 
IC mechanism is IR if and only if : And following corollary is introduced: 
Corollary: 
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Equation 16 
Proof : Since from IC condition we know that the following applies : 
Equation 17 
And from the corollary: 
Equation 18 
The third term in the right side follows that: 
Equation 19 
Analogously for the buyer follows that: 
Equation 20 
And if we equate the both sides: 
Equation 21 
IR mechanism is proved since . 
Balanced budget  
Transfers   between the players are: and  is the transfer that 
player  receives. Now we are considering a transfer ,where : 
Equation 22 
From previous expression clearly transfers balance. Where i.e. do it or not do it eg. public 
project, , and ex-post efficiency required that : 
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Equation 23 
Also we have to note that : 
Equation 24 
VCG mechanism does not satisfy weak balanced budget condition. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves, auction is 
named after Vickrey(1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)for their papers that generalized the idea. 
VCG mechanism is a direct quasi-linear mechanism. 
Equation 25 
. 
And under Groves mechanism we have : 
Equation 26 
In Groves mechanism price constraint is given as follows: 
Equation 27 
There budget balance requires : 
Equation 28 
Or 
Equation 29 
But previous cannot happen if  is independent of  .Solution is in weak incentive compatibility 
criterion, so truth as dominant strategy in this mechanism is merely a Bayesian equilibrium rather than 
a dominant strategy. Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) is presented as: 
Equation 30 
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And the budged balance that satisfies than is .One example of mechanism is second 
degree price discrimination with a continuum types when monopolist practices price discrimination 
via quantity discounts when there is continuum of types. Quasi-linear utility function is given as: 
Equation 31 
Where  is the consumption of the good and  is the amount paid to the firm or taxes to the state (for 
the amount  units in it). Type of the customer is drawn from a 
distribution: .Spence-Mirrlees condition holds at : 
Equation 32 
Now ,this follows because  is an inverse demand curve , an inverse demand curves 
are positive ,proof is given below: 
Proof: 
Let  and now we observe : 
Equation 33 
Previous expression follows form the fact that  and .Expected profit in this mechanism 
with transfers due to Mirrlees (1971) is given as: 
Equation 34 
In the previous expression  are the marginal costs, and  are the transfers or the amount paid to the 
firm or the state (taxes). For the scheme to be feasible it must satisfy IR and IC constraints. The IR 
constraint is simply:  .For the IC constraints we consider two arbitrary 
consumer types and each one is larger than the other: 
Equation 35 
Previous two expressions are known as revealed preference (RP) now if we substitute 
 for  we have: 
Equation 36 
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If we combine previous two expressions such as: 
Equation 37 
Previous implies that : 
Equation 38 
By the fundamental theorem of calculus : 
Equation 39 
For the inequality to hold it must be that :  .This implies that inverse demand curve is 
positive and monotonic and differentiable . 
Now if we set some measure  (endpoint in integration) towards which all points will converge 
Equation 40 
For previous to hold it must be that  so this applies as long as  . The limit of the left terms 
is given as: 
Equation 41 
And , this means that  first derivative of the utility 
functions is : 
Equation 42 
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Previous expression is the utility function without transfers and with transfers utility function is  : 
Equation 43 
Previous means that if the preference tastes are equal there will be no need of transfers and 
But since  it follows that 
Extension to Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem 
Supposedly when there are many buyers and sellers (not just one buyer and one seller as M-S 
supposed) inefficiency asymptotically disappears. This is the case of private goods,  
Theorem 2. Shapley-Folkman theorem ,Star (1969) 
Let  be an  dimensional Euclidean space, the let  denote the its convex hull for any , 
now ,then , for at least 
indices of .Khan and Rath (2013) 
Proof of the theorem, Zhou (1993): let has a representation  and 
,and let Constructed  vectors are 
given as: .From previous expression 
.Now, .Because there 
are  in total, there is at least one  ,and there are at most  indices  that 
have more than one ,and  for at least indices 
Preposition : 
Preposition also here is continuous function (continuity condition) i.e. the condition for continuity as 
given in Robbin, et al. (1987), where states that  is said to be continuous on   if   
Equation 44 
In the previous expression  is a trimmed price space. Trimmed space is a location parameter class of 
probability functions that is parametrized by scalar or vector valued parameter  which determines 
distributions or shift of the distribution. Also, if there are  commodities, and a nonnegative orthant  
of Euclidean space  is introduced is introduced, then the sets  and  are 
closed. Here  are preferences of a trader in a pure exchange economy (Starr 1969). The assumption 
of convexity assumes that if  , then , this means that any weighted average 
or convex combination of  and  is preferred to  , . Each trader has initial endowment 
bundle and stars with a positive amount of some good . 
Convex hull (A convex hull is the smallest polygon that encloses a group of objects, such as points is 
given as: 
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Equation 45 
Now if so,  is an countably additive measure if 
,when  is a sequence of disjoint pairs of sets in . The 
measure  purely atomic if there is scalar measure  such that , and if , for every 
measurable set for which .And if there is a sequence such that 
. This is called an atomic or only positive measure (Bogachev 
2007, Aliprantis and Border 2013, Halmos 2013, Hewitt and Stromberg 2013). 
Theorem 3 Second Fundamental welfare theorem 
Second Fundamental welfare Theorem: Given an economy such as; we 
assume that , allocation is given with  ,and a price vector , (here 
 ), and this combination constitutes price quasi-equilibrium with transfers 
, subject to the following budget constraint: ,where: 
1. .( firm maximizes profit by producing ) 
2. .(if  then it cannot cost less than ). 
3. And .(budget constraint )  
Here we define   (strictly preferred than  ) also ,and  is convex due to 
convexity of a preference relation ,and  is convex since  are convex. Point number 2 is the only 
difference with the definition of price equilibrium since  is quasi-price equilibrium (weak 
inequality). Definition of preference relation and preference properties are given below. 
Definition : Preference relation  is a relation .With properties 
(reflexivity),  (transitivity),  is a closed set (continuity), 
(completeness) ,given (boundary 
condition),A is convex,if is convex set for every whenever 
and , Mas-Colell, A. (1986). This theorem holds if preferences are convex i.e.: The 
set  is convex compact and nonempty set if .There is 
a theorem that gives sufficient conditions for the existence of hyperplane separating sets, that is the 
Separating hyperplane theorem. In geometry hyperplane of an  dimensional vector space  is a 
subspace of a dimension, or equivalently of codimension 1 in .In geometry, the hyperplane 
separation theorem is a theorem about disjoint convex sets in n-dimensional Euclidean space. 
Theorem 3 Separating hyperplane theorem  
Definition of a hyperplane : Hyperplane in  can be described by an equation , here 
vector  is a non-zero price vector, and   is scalar (Simon and Blume 1994, Yu and Phillips 
2018) 
Equation 46 
Separating hyperplane theorem: Let’s suppose that is a convex and closed set and 
Convex sets  are 
disjoint .Then there is a hyperplane 
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that separates  and ,leaving them on different sides of it. In support of this theorem if  is 
convex and . If and are convex, 
. Let’s say that if   is a boundary point of set 
Proof lemma 3.1 :if  is a closed and convex set 3,  , and if  is the boundary of this set, then 
there exists scalar such that: .Previous theorem 
( , where is an m-dimensional price vector)holds if 
,this theorem is also true when (Fibich and Gavish 2011)..Here  is the 
dimension of  production set. Now  is  dimensional vector,  is  dimensional vector and  is 
one dimensional scalar: , n-dimensional set is: .Now , from these 
two convex sets   follows that:  , and 
. 
Asymmetric auctions  
There exists literature in the subject of asymmetric auctions namely: Maskin, Riley (2000), Fibich, 
Gavious (2003),Fibich, Gavish (2011), Güth,et al. (2005),Gayle, Richard (2008), Hubbard, et al. 
(2013). 
Basic setup of the asymmetric auction 
There exist set: ,of types of bidders. And and  which 
are bidders of type . Bidders of type draw an IPV for the object from CDF .It is 
assumed that  and  on .The inverse of equilibrium bidding 
strategy, Maskin and Riley (2000) and Fibich and Gavish (2011) is given as: 
Equation 47 
Solution to the maximization problem given 
as is: 
Equation 48 
Bidders expected revenue in the FPA asymmetric auction is given as: 
Equation 49 
Bidder maximizes : 
3 Its complement is an open set. Closed set is defined as a set that contains all of its limit points. 
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Equation 50 
, where  denotes the player of type . Where in previous 
expressions , and probabilities of winning the reserve price auction are given as: 
Equation 51 
Auctioneer expected revenue is given with the following expression: 
Equation 52 
As for comparison in FPA symmetric auction bids and probabilities of winning are given as: 
Expected revenue in FPA symmetric auction and maximal bid are given as: 
or 
where  is CRRA coefficient, and  this is because .The CRRA utility 
function is given as, Arrow,1965: 
Equation 53 
,when
Elasticity of substitution is , and ,when  than FPA-bid functions 
are in form: 
Equation 54 
,or, when 
In the previous expression  represents the reserve price. Now, If the coefficient of risk aversion 
is CARA (Constant absolute risk aversion), i.e. , where  than the bidding 
function is given as 
Equation 55 
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SPA auction NE 
In SPA auctions dominant strategy is to bid truthfully i.e.  . The probability to win an 
auction is given as: , the expected payoff if wins is given as:  . The expected profit in 
SPA auction and expected revenue,Kunimoto (2008), are given as: 
1. 
2. 
Or in the reserve price auction SPA auction CDF of revenue is given as; 
Equation 56 
Uncertain number of bidders 
In FPA with uncertain number of bidder equilibrium bid function is given as: 
Equation 57 
Where in previous expression  denotes the probability that player 1 believe that he will be only 
one present at the auction (the only participant). In a symmetric auction with only two bidders we can 
write .CDF is given as: 
Equation 58 
SPA with uncertain number of bidders will still have the same strategy and Nash equilibrium since it 
will not change the uncertainty of players attendance. 
Back to asymmetric auction: weak and strong bidders’ equilibrium 
Now, let  be an equilibrium bid of an strong bidder and  is an equilibrium bid of an weak bidder. 
Than we have following problem to maximize: FOC is: 
Equation 59 
Strong bidder maximizes 
Equation 60 
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Theorem: Suppose that , meaning that conditionally first-order stochastically 
dominates .Than when one compares FPA and SPA, both uniformly distributed following applies: 
1. 
2. 
Proof: For purposes of the proof  have the same range so a matching function is defined 
as:  or as a weak bidder that bids equal to strong bidder in FPA. Since from 
previous we know that in FPA, now we know that .The strong bidder 
expected payoff is given as: 
Equation 61 
Because when distribution of values is uniform. By the envelope theorem 
Milgrom and Ilya 2002 value function for FPA and SPA (no bid shading)are given as: 
Equation 62 
Since and that  is strictly increasing, the strong bidder prefers SPA. For the weak bidders 
expected payoff for the FPA and SPA are given as: 
Equation 63 
Since  expected payoff is higher for the weak bidder in the FPA. 
Numerical example and proof of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem 
In this part we choose 9 bidder types, there is only one bidder from each type, and these bidders draw 
their IPVs from for the object of the auction from their CDF  .Ten selected 
distributions in the following order are, (see,(Johnson, Kemp et al. 2005)) : 
Table 1 Bidders’ distributions, boundaries and CDF’s 
Distributions and boundaries CDF 
exponential , 
gamma , 
lognormal , 
Norma[01,] 
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standard normal 
power
Reverse power
Uniform 
Weibull [0,1] 
On the previous table nine types of bidders’ (types of statistical distribution) selected were presented. 
On the second column Cumulative distribution functions of the selected distribution types were 
presented. In probability theory and statistics, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a real 
valued random variable ,or just the distribution function of ,evaluated at , it is probability 
that: ,where , or if it is a continuous random 
variable CDF of a function can be presented as: or in the case of absolutely 
continuous .On the next table results from the Backward shooting method are 
explained, followed by the small explanation of the computation method used. 
Table 2 Backward shooting method results, reserve price=0.5; end result: Convergence false 
b_bar A B B-A Result 
0/39 0.5 0 1.00000000 1.00E+03 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
1/39 0.75 0.5 1.00000000 5.00E+02 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
2/39 0.875 0.75 1.00000000 2.50E+02 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
3/39 0.9375 0.875 1.00000000 1.25E+02 2 
Solution diverges to 
+Infinity. 
4/39 0.90625 0.875 0.9375 6.25E+01 2 
Solution diverges to 
+Infinity. 
5/39 0.890625 0.875 0.90625 3.13E+01 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
6/39 0.882813 0.875 0.890625 1.56E+01 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
7/39 0.878906 0.875 0.8828125 7.81E+00 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
8/39 0.876953 0.875 0.87890625 3.91E+00 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
9/39 0.875977 0.875 0.876953125 1.95E+00 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
10/39 0.876465 0.875977 0.876953125 9.77E-01 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
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11/39 0.876709 0.876465 0.876953125 4.88E-01 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
12/39 0.876587 0.876465 0.876708984 2.44E-01 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
13/39 0.876526 0.876465 0.876586914 1.22E-01 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
14/39 0.876495 0.876465 0.876525879 6.10E-02 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
15/39 0.876511 0.876495 0.876525879 3.05E-02 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
16/39 0.876518 0.876511 0.876525879 1.53E-02 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
17/39 0.876522 0.876518 0.876525879 7.63E-03 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
18/39 0.87652 0.876518 0.876522064 3.82E-03 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
19/39 0.876519 0.876518 0.876520157 1.91E-03 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
20/39 0.87652 0.876519 0.876520157 9.54E-04 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
21/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.876520157 4.77E-04 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
22/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.876520157 2.38E-04 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
23/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.876520038 1.19E-04 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
24/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.876520038 5.96E-05 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
25/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.876520008 2.98E-05 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
26/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.876520008 1.49E-05 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
27/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 7.45E-06 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
28/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 3.73E-06 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
29/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 1.86E-06 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
30/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 9.31E-07 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
31/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 4.66E-07 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
32/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 2.33E-07 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
33/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 1.16E-07 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
34/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 5.82E-08 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
35/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 2.91E-08 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
36/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 1.46E-08 3 
Solution not within 
specified tolerances. 
37/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 7.28E-09 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
38/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 3.64E-09 3 Solution not within 
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specified tolerances. 
39/39 0.87652 0.87652 0.87652 1.82E-09 1 
Solution diverges to -
Infinity. 
Highest Bid: ,Shooting Terminated at b = 
0.5000000000002981. (b_underbar = 0.5) 
Euler method used in backward shooting solver is described as the simplest Runge-Kutta method, 
ODE is of the form: , , ,
.The iterative solutions is than given as or in previous expressions 
.On the next graph Revenue CDFs and bid distributions are presented under Backward 
shooting method. 
Figure 1 Revenue CDF and bid distribution with the Backward shooting method 
Next are presented results (inverse bid functions) under Chebychev Approximation and some 
explanation of the method: 
x = x(b) = (b - 0.5) / 0.38906945006425353 
Inverse bid functions  
1. ϕ0(x) =   0.359684 +   0.742969*T[1] -   0.111041*T[2] -   0.018979*T[3] +   0.045910*T[4]
-   0.019714*T[5]
2. ϕ1(x) =   0.400034 +   0.680654*T[1] -   0.106074*T[2] +   0.014502*T[3] +   0.013428*T[4]
-   0.004174*T[5]
3. ϕ2(x) =   0.399226 +   0.699775*T[1] -   0.113911*T[2] +   0.003953*T[3] +   0.013566*T[4]
-   0.002641*T[5]
4. ϕ3(x) =   0.350580 +   0.760549*T[1] -   0.120452*T[2] -   0.017967*T[3] +   0.046234*T[4]
-   0.019976*T[5]
5. ϕ4(x) =   0.352117 +   0.756530*T[1] -   0.121779*T[2] -   0.012382*T[3] +   0.042888*T[4]
-   0.018589*T[5]
6. ϕ5(x) =   0.382672 +   0.711359*T[1] -   0.119968*T[2] +   0.015069*T[3] +   0.016516*T[4]
-   0.006692*T[5]
7. ϕ6(x) =   0.402056 +   0.702233*T[1] -   0.112901*T[2] +   0.010328*T[3] +   0.008493*T[4]
-   0.013409*T[5]
Page 157
8. ϕ7(x) =   0.345038 +   0.773671*T[1] -   0.136984*T[2] -   0.001167*T[3] +   0.035691*T[4]
-   0.016898*T[5]
9. ϕ8(x) =   0.360848 +   0.744004*T[1] -   0.124400*T[2] -   0.000162*T[3] +   0.032328*T[4]
-   0.013832*T[5]
High Bid: 0.8890694500642535
About Chebyshev coefficients we pose the following theorem: 
Theorem:Every function defined on [-1,1], so long as it is at least Lipschitz continuous, has an 
absolutely and uniformly convergent Chebyshev series: 
equation 64 
The same holds on an interval [a,b] with appropriately scaled and shifted Chebyshev polynomials.The 
coefficients  of these polynomials for a function  can be obtained by the following integral: 
Equation 65 
Hubbard ,Paarsch (2009)used Chebyshev polynomials, which are orthogonal polynomials and more 
stable. Chebyshev nodes can be computed as: .The points 
are found via transformation like this: .Graphical depiction of 
revenue CDFs and bid distribution follows. 
Figure 2 Revenue CDFs and bid distribution with the Chebyshev Approximation 
A fixed point is a point that does not change upon of a function (map), system of differential 
equations etc. (Shashkin 1991) . In the Newton’s method the algorithm can be applied iteratively to 
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obtain: ,if ,and ,where 
. 
Theorem Fixed point theorem: if ,then and 
 , see(Rosenlicht 1968) 
Results : convergence true  
Next will finish with a depiction on a graph of Revenue CDFs and bid distribution under Fixed point 
iteration.  
Figure 3 Revenue CDF and bid distribution with the Fixed point iteration 
From the graphs one can conclude that Spence-Mirrleessingle crossing condition holds ,except in the 
Backward shooting method. The terms SCC (single crossing condition) refers to the requirement that 
the isoutility curves for agents of different types cross only once, Laffont, Martimort (2002). This can 
be defined as follows by : 
Assumption : 
Equation 66 
This condition translates in that higher the agent’s type  , the higher his marginal utility, that is that 
increase in agent’s type means that the agent is willing to trade more, and this is true at all levels of 
quantities traded . This means that this a requirement of a constant sign on the utility function i.e. 
second partial derivative  of the marginal utility function to be monotone in . That means that the 
agents rent is positive: and that , where 
represents the current transfers. This is important for the incentive compatibility condition to holds 
and that is to be satisfied allocation rule and the revelation principle that is: 
Allocation rule:
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Revelation principle: 
Revelation mechanism: and  where  then it must 
satisfy: .So if Spence -Mirrlees condition holds with 
positive sign then  is IC only and only if: 
Trade loss is depicted on the following table and graph. 
Table 3  median value, virtual value and loss  
Distributions and 
boundaries 
Median value 
Virtual value =0 
at x=? 
Loss 
exponential , 0.438140 0.467503 
-
0.4383800000002551 
gamma , 0.154211 
0.363593 
-
0.7223090000002551 
lognormal , 0.713734 0.547381 
-
0.1627860000002551 
Normal[01,] 0.539199 0.486289 
-
0.3373210000002551 
standard normal 0.441771 0.458464 
-
0.4347490000002551 
power 0.250000 0.444444 -
0.6265200000002551 
Reverse power 0.750000 
0.666667 
-
0.1265200000002551 
Uniform 0.500000 
0.500000 
-
0.3765200000002551 
Weibull [0,1] 0.379885 0.432857 
-
0.4966350000002551 
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Figure 4 Median distributions of value of the bidders, virtual valuations and depiction of trade loss 
Virtual valuations of an agent is a function that measures the surplus that can be extracted from that 
agent. Virtual valuation according to Myerson (1981)is equal to: 
equation 67 
And  so called revision functions such thatif another bidder  learned that 
was the  bider valuation estimate  for the object, then  would revise his own valuation by 
 , so that : 
equation 68 
Where ,similarly seller raises his bid , 
if he learned that  was the vector of estimates held by the bidders. In the case of pure 
preference uncertainty, we have: 
equation 69 
Conclusion 
Auction in most general terms is a game theoretic mechanism which allocates an object (set of 
objects) and is composed of set of bidders  , set of objects allocated , a private type space , and 
public type space . And where each bidder has type of distributions ,and 
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,which represents thespace of all type profiles, see (Katzwer (2012)). In 
the First price auction (blind auction),all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids, so that no bidder 
knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the price they submitted, so this is 
how this auction differs from SPA auction,Krishna (2009).Effectively First price sealed bid auctions 
are called tendering for procurement by companies and organizations, eg.  government contracts and 
mining leases. This contrasts to GSPA auctions (or position auctions (sponsored search on Yahoo and 
Google search engines) generalized by Varian (2006)), where winning bidders pays price offered by 
the second highest bidder (eg.eBay auction and Google Ads).A mining lease gives the holder the 
exclusive right to conduct mining operations and sell the minerals specified in the conditions attached 
to the lease. So how should the bidders’ bid in FPSBA? They should bid lower than their valuation 
(shading price).And while this mechanism leads to high eCPMs  (effective cost per thousand 
impressions, .) for the publishers inventory it can lead to 
unnaturally high prices, as buyers are forced to “guesstimate” how much their competition bid. So, in 
a game of incomplete information such as auction Bayesian Nash equilibrium is appropriate 
concept.But problem here is that:The efficient allocation cannotbe achieved by ANY Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium in ANY mechanism. This leads in worst case to market failure.FPSBA is not IC 
(incentive compatible mechanism),since there is no Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which bidders 
report their true value. This contrasts basic requirement. Two (IC and ex-post PE (Pareto efficiency)) 
out of four basic requirements of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem (1983) are not satisfied. So,one 
of the partiesis forced to trade at loss.  
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